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ABSTRACT:  The paper seeks to recast the goal of nudge policy from a goal of achieving a specific 
result determined by government or by behavioral economists to a goal of giving individuals as much 
power as is practical to decide the choice architecture they face. We call a nudge with such a giving 
individuals “power over choice mechanisms” goal a non-paternalistic nudge policy. The goal of non-
paternalistic nudge policy is not to achieve a better result as seen by government or by behavioral 
economists. The goal of non-paternalistic nudge policy is to achieve a better result as seen by the agents 
being nudged as revealed through their choices of choice architectures. We argue that non-paternalistic 
nudge policy fits much better with the values inherent in Classical liberalism than does libertarian 
paternalistic nudge policy. 
I. INTRODUCTION 
 
Behavioral economics adds a new dimension to economic policy; it allows for the 
possibility of influencing people’s decisions through a change in the choice 
architecture they face. The nudge policy work of Richard Thaler and Cass Sunstein 
(2003a, 2003b, 2008) is probably the best known, and in their book Nudge, they have 
popularized the concept of nudge policy as a description for behavioral economic 
policy. They argue that their nudge policies provide a way in using insights 
developed in behavioral economics into policy in a minimally intrusive way, arguing 
that their nudge policies meet libertarian paternalistic criteria. Nudge policies have 
won widespread popular acclaim and have been discussed in popular outlets such as 
The New York Times (2009),  Time  (Grunwald 2008) and Newsweek (Will 2009) 
among others, which all report that nudge policies are being incorporated into 
government policy.1 
                                                 
* Received: March 28, 2010. Accepted: May 11, 2010. Email: colander@middlebury.edu. 
1 Sunstein has also been appointed the head of the Office of Information and Regulatory Affairs, which conducts 
analysis and oversees the development and implementation of government regulation. THE JOURNAL OF ECONOMIC ANALYSIS (Vol. I, No. I) 
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Nudge policies have not been supported by all economists; in fact, it has been 
attacked by some traditional economists as being just another form of government 
regulation and does not improve social welfare. Nudge policy advocates have 
responded in two ways. First, they argue that there are ways of distinguishing true 
or “normative” preferences, and thus of insuring that nudge policies improve social 
welfare. (Choi et al. 2003, Beshears et al. 2008). Second, they impose limits on choice 
architecture policy so that the policies only minimally affect consumers’ and 
businesses’ freedom to choose. This underlies their claim that such nudge policies 
meet a libertarian paternalism criterion and are welfare improving even by 
libertarian criteria.2 
Neither response has been fully successful in convincing critics. While most 
economists agree that behavioral economists have shown that people have 
preferences that are influenced by choice architecture, many are not convinced that 
behavioral economists can discern “true” preferences (see, for example, Becker and 
Murphy 1988). Similarly, the libertarian paternalism justification for nudge policies 
has been unconvincing to critics. Posner, for example calls “libertarian paternalism” 
an oxymoron, and sees Thaler more as a “paternalist with a velvet glove.” The 
reality is that only a small set of policies that behavioral economists advocate fall 
under a strict definition of a libertarian paternalistic nudge, and those that do, don’t 
need an elaborate philosophical justification involving paternalism; they can be 
justified by common sense and classical liberal views alone.  
For example, consider the nudge concerning the default option that 
government provides for people when they enroll in a government health insurance 
plan. Since some choice architecture must be chosen by government, it seems 
reasonable that government should make a decision it sees as best for consumers. 
Such nudges can be justified by common sense. It is certainly better than the 
alternative of choosing a program that the government does not believe is in the 
consumer’s interest. Alternatively, think of Austan Goolsbee’s automatic filled out 
tax return proposal (2006).3  This nudge is paternalistic only in the sense that 
government is looking out for people’s welfare. Neither of these nudges involve 
government expanding its domain over people’s choices. The same reasoning holds 
in reference to nudge policies that firms can voluntarily choose to implement. If a 
firm voluntarily wants to provide their employees with a savings default option that 
behavioral economists believe will make its employees better off, then it seems 
reasonable that it do so, and no libertarian paternalism justification is needed.4  
A much broader range of behavioral economist’s proposed policies go beyond 
choice architecture involving government programs or nudges on employees imposed 
voluntarily by businesses. These involve non-voluntary nudges on the part of firms, 
and might be better classified as a “slight pushes.” In these cases, the firm, not the 
consumer or the employee, is currently making the choice about choice architecture. 
Thaler and Sunstein’s paternalistic nudge policy would require firms to change that 
                                                 
2 They describe libertarian paternalistic nudge policies as policies that seek “to expand or maintain freedom of choice 
as far as possible.” 
3 This nudge involves the IRS providing citizens with a fully filled out form which can, but need not be used. 
4 In many cases, the firm’s interests in making a decision about choice architecture will likely differ from that of the 
subgroup which is being affected by the default option, which means that they will not want to make a change 
voluntarily. For example, a firm that provides with a matching grant for a savings program might be better off if it 
chooses a choice architecture where fewer employees choose to enroll in it; since the firm can seem beneficent, and 
those employees who strongly care can take advantage of the policy, but the firm can hold costs down of being 
beneficent by choosing non-enrollment as the default option. THE JOURNAL OF ECONOMIC ANALYSIS (Vol. I, No. I) 
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choice architecture to a choice architecture that behavioral economists believe will 
be better at letting people’s “true” preferences be met. From the point of view of the 
firm, this is not a nudge; this is a government regulation. It is in such “slight push” 
policies where the issue of paternalism enters in because in order to undertake the 
push, government has to assume that it, based on advice by behavioral economists, 
knows what is best for the individual. Thaler and Sunstein see this paternalism as 
justified because the goal of the policy is “to influence choice in a way that will make 
choosers better off, as judged by themselves.” (Thaler and Sunstein 2008, p. 8) They 
do not make it clear how those choices are to be self-judged, and in a num of their 
proposed nudges Thaler and Sunstein have assumed that government or behavioral 
economists are capable of making the judgment about what makes the consumer 
better off.  
For example, Thaler and Sunstein implicitly assume that people would be 
better off with a choice architecture that encourages them to save more. By making 
this and similar assumptions, they are replacing their views for the consumer’s 
views. Our argument is that the explicit goal of nudge policy in this case should not 
be to encourage individuals to save more; rather it should be to give individuals the 
choice of whether they want a choice architecture that is more likely to encourage to 
save more. This is a subtle, but important, distinction that Thaler and Sunstein 
gloss over, and which underlies the difference between our non-paternalistic and 
their paternalistic nudge policy.  
Their glossing over it is why their nudge policy has been appropriately 
criticized as not libertarian. Our solution to this is to remove the direct paternalism 
from the policy by slightly modify the goal of nudge policy. Government’s goal in 
non-paternalistic nudge policy is not to influence consumers to make a “right” choice, 
but instead is to allow them to decide the choice architecture they desire. While this 
slight redefinition of goal certainly raises issues of its own, and does not totally solve 
the problem, it is, in our view, an approach more consistent with libertarianism than 
is the Thaler and Sunstein exposition of nudge policy.  
 
II.  NUDGE POLICIES, CLASSICAL LIBERALISM AND NON-
PATERNALISTIC NUDGES 
 
Nudge policies that are determined by government are by nature paternalistic, and 
are subject to all the criticisms that can be mounted against any paternalistic policy. 
In a Classical liberal framework, government interventions can only be justified as a 
last resort.5 This does, however, not mean that the classical liberal position would 
rule out all government intervention; it only means that it would first search for 
architectures that would allow people to make choices about choice architecture for 
themselves as far as is practically possible, before it turns to government.  
                                                 
5 Terminology such as libertarian and paternalism are value-laden. We find it more useful to discuss policies in 
relation to Classical liberalism, by which we mean the approach of economists such a John Stuart Mill. In On 
Liberty, John Stuart Mill argues that “with respect to his own feelings, the most ordinary man or woman has means 
of knowledge immeasurably surpassing those that can be possessed by anyone else,” and that since government 
decisions “must be grounded on general assumptions,” “which may altogether be wrong” or if right “misapplied to 
individual cases” by outsiders, governments should keep out of trying to make decisions for people where these 
decisions do not impinge on the liberties of others (Mill 1869). This view, in our view, captures the essence of 
classical liberalism—that people know their own feelings and preferences better than anyone else, and that people 
have both a responsibility and a right to make these decisions for themselves It is that policy view that we believe 
captures the policy view of traditional economists today. THE JOURNAL OF ECONOMIC ANALYSIS (Vol. I, No. I) 
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To see our argument, it is helpful to think of the general policy problem that 
behavioral economists have posed to the theory of economic policy. By explicitly 
recognizing that choice architecture influences choices, they have recognized that, 
when revealed choices are influenced by choice architecture, economic policy must 
make decisions about the choice architecture that best brings out people’s “correct” 
or “true” preferences. Only the “correct” choice architecture will reveal the “correct” 
or “true” revealed preferences, so one cannot be separated from the other. This 
problem of the interconnection between choice architecture and “true” preferences 
has not been addressed by economic theorists before because they have assumed 
away ambiguous preferences, and thus have studied a model in which people’s 
revealed preferences are their true preferences.  
The natural Classical liberal theoretical answer to the problem of ambiguous 
choice is to let people choose the choice architecture in which they make choices. The 
problem with that answer is that those metadecisions on choice architectures would, 
themselves, be made in some context, which means that people also have to make 
decisions on the choice architecture of the choice architecture as well. In fact, the 
same argument can be carried through ad infinitum, making the theoretical problem 
of who is to determine what way to nudge an infinite regress. This infinite regress 
cannot be avoided, and does not prevent a government that believes in Classical 
liberal ideas from trying to give individuals as much control over it can over the 
choice architecture they face. Doing precisely that is the policy that we believe is 
most consistent with the philosophy Thaler and Sunstein suggest is behind nudge 
policy. But that policy is not paternalistic. It is as minimally paternalistic as is 
practically possible, and we believe that a policy consistent with that should be 
called a   non-paternalistic classical liberal nudge policy. It is achieved by making 
the explicit goal of the nudge policy giving people as much choice over choice 
architecture as is practically possible, and not as making them more likely to arrive 
at a particular preference that is determined by some outside group, however well 
meaning that group may be. Only this “giving people choice over choice architecture” 
goal will meet classical libertarian standards. 
While implementing a non-paternalistic nudge policy will likely involve 
regulation of firms, since, through inertia and current laws, firms have exerted a 
much greater control over choice architecture than is consistent with a classical 
liberal conception of the way a market economy should work. Implementing a non-
paternalistic nudge policy would not involve the government choosing a choice 
architecture. Instead, it would involve indirect regulation of the decision process 
rather than direct regulation of outcomes. For example, a non-paternalistic nudge 
policy would not require firms to structure choice architecture in a certain way. 
Instead it would require parties relevant to the decisions, such as firms, customers 
and employees, to collectively develop architectures that take all groups preferences 
about architecture into account in setting up choice architecture that directly affects 
them.  
For firms, this policy offers more maneuverability than direct government 
regulation and also allows them to use their innovation and resources to satisfy 
consumers, and to differentiate themselves, in what can be regarded as competition 
for a market for a new good. Consumers, of course, are the big winners. In effect, the 
policy encourages a bottom-up regulation where consumers have more choice about 
the choice architecture they face. From a Classical liberal perspective such “choice of 
choice architecture” regulation and be justified by the lesser evil argument, since it THE JOURNAL OF ECONOMIC ANALYSIS (Vol. I, No. I) 
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will likely involve less pressure for paternalistic top-down regulation of market 
architecture. By giving the individual more explicit responsibility for the choice 
architecture he or she faces, one reduces the pressure for paternalistic measures. It 
is extending Friedman’s “free to choose” argument to freedom of choice over choice 
mechanisms. 
 
III.  SOME THOUGHTS ON DESIGNING A WORKABLE CHOICE 
ARCHITECTURE FOR CHOICE ARCHITECTURE 
 
To provide an example of what we mean by non-paternalistic nudge policy and how 
it contrasts with libertarian paternalistic nudge policy, let us consider the example 
of cafeteria food placement that Thaler and Sunstein use to introduce the concept of 
nudge policy. In their example, Carolyn, a hypothetical director of food services for a 
large city school system, is making a choice about choice architecture for the 
students. They present five possible options that Carolyn received as suggestions 
from her friends and coworkers. These options were:  
1.  Arrange the food to make the students best off, all things considered. 
2.  Choose the food order at random. 
3.  Try to arrange the food to get the kids to pick the same foods they would 
choose on their own. 
4.  Maximize the sales of the items from the suppliers that are willing to offer 
the largest bribes.  
5.  Maximize profits, period. (Thaler and Sunstein 2008, Pg. 2)  
Notice that all the options involve Carolyn making some decision for the students. 
They argue that if you choose option 1 you are supporting their nudge policy. We do 
not support option 1, and do not believe it meets a classical liberal criterion. Instead, 
our non-paternalistic nudge policy would involve choosing option 6.  
6.  Provide students with relevant information, and empower or burdened them, 
depending on your perspective, with the responsibility of explicitly making the 
choice about choice architecture themselves. 
This option conveys the essence of a non-paternalistic nudge policy; it leaves 
the consumer the choice over choice architecture but designs institutional structures 
to get him or her the information, and establishes an architecture that provides the 
student the opportunity to reflect seriously on that choice.6  
Our new preferred option 6 is very similar to their option 3, and if option 3 
included the addendum “if architectures were in place that provided relevant 
information to students and provided a framework which encouraged the students to 
think seriously about it”, it would be identical. It recognizes that many choices are 
ambiguous so without specifying a choice architecture of the choice architecture 
within which students choose on their own, option 3 is meaningless. Option 6 makes 
it meaningful; the goal of a non-paternalistic nudge policy is to design choice 
architecture to make people think seriously about the choices they make, not to lead 
them to make any specific decision.  
While our proposed modification changes the explicitly stated goal of nudge 
policy, we see it as a friendly amendment to nudge policy and to applied behavioral 
economics work. It primarily involves a change in the way nudge policies are 
                                                 
6 Obviously, there is a paternalistic outside judgment here—the judgment that thinking seriously about choice is 
good, and in principle, this judgment should in principle also be subject to consumer choice. In practice it would 
probably be impossible; because of the infinite regress nature of the problem, there is no fully neutral position.  THE JOURNAL OF ECONOMIC ANALYSIS (Vol. I, No. I) 
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thought about and presented. Many of Thaler and Sunstein’s examples of nudge 
policy already are non-paternalistic nudge policies; they just don’t always make it 
explicit that giving people greater freedom of choice over choice mechanisms is their 
primary goal.7 Many of their suggestions involve giving consumers greater choice 
and awareness over choice architecture, especially where choice architecture can be 
tailored towards the individual. That’s what makes them so appealing.  
But they blend such non-paternalistic nudges with others that go beyond 
giving consumers greater choice and awareness of choice architecture. Their 
example of food placement was one example of a nudge that does not meet our non-
paternalistic criteria. We suspect that one reason why they blend the two is that the 
decision about cafeteria food is complicated by the fact that a collective decision has 
to be made by students since it is impossible to have a separate choice architecture 
for each student in this example. Thus, the choice architecture has to be designed for 
the entire group. Determining a workable collective choice architecture to 
adequately reflect the views of a group involves all the problems of collective choice 
that have been discussed in the work of economists such as Amayta Sen (1970) and 
Albert Hirschman (1970). Such architectures are difficult to create, and involve 
serious problems and compromises by individuals within the collective. We argue 
that these are precisely the type of problems that behavioral economic policy should 
be concerning itself with when dealing with choice architecture that cannot be 
tailored for the individual.  
We don’t know what choice architecture is best in this cafeteria example, and 
our goal here is not to argue for any particular choice architecture; it is simply to 
argue that this is what a Classical liberal behavioral policy would involve. A 
classical liberal policy would advocate that students should be allowed to make 
decisions about policies that would affect them as far as is practically possible.8  
As a second example of where non-paternalistic nudge policy will differ from 
Thaler’s and Sunstein’s paternalistic nudge policy, consider the U.S. Consumer 
Financial Protection Agency Act of 2009. That act incorporates a variety of nudges 
that behavioral economists believe would better serve customers. For example, one 
nudge would offer sellers of financial instrument safe harbor from being sued if they 
offered a “plain vanilla” product “designed to be read in less than three minutes.” 
The goal of this nudge is to eliminate much of the fine print that currently is in 
financial products. A non-paternalistic nudge policy would not start with such a 
specific goal. Instead, its goal would be to set up architectures through which 
financial consumers could work with firms to decide what the nature of offered 




A non-paternalistic  nudge policy is not a panacea; it involves many of the 
complications and difficult judgments that paternalistic nudge policies have avoided 
                                                 
7 Similarly, some of the methods that Beshears, Choi, Laibson and Madrian (2008) present as methods by which 
behavioral economists can discover people’s “true” preferences can be seen as methods of giving people choice over 
choice architectures.  
8 The fact that students are doing the deciding here raises the question of at what age paternalism should end and 
individual freedom of choice should begin. While our view is that even young students could benefit from being 
involved in the choice, the specific example is not one that we want to defend in this paper. We use this as an 
example only.  THE JOURNAL OF ECONOMIC ANALYSIS (Vol. I, No. I) 
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by the assumption that government and behavioral economists can, and will have 
incentives to, discern people’s “true” preferences, and will be able to set up choice 
architecture to direct people to make decisions that arrive at those true preferences. 
Non-paternalistic nudge policy holds that that assumption is unwarranted. There is 
no guarantee that government or behavioral economists can discover people’s true 
preferences, and thus the goal of non-paternalistic nudge policy is to develop choice 
architectures that will be more likely to bring out people’s true preferences than the 
current architecture. By changing the goal of nudge policy to empowering the 
consumer rather than doing what the government thinks is best for the consumer, it 
makes nudge power more compatible with classical liberalism, and thus more likely 
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